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Abstract: 
This article analyses whether automation and offshorability risks overlap with non-
standard employment. The research uses data from Spain, as this is a country with one of 
the highest temporary employment rates across the world since the 1990s. In general, the 
analysis shows that automation risks affect slightly more to those with non-standard work 
arrangements. However, higher educational level is crucial to be much less exposed to 
automation risks, irrespective of the type of contract or the working time. The 
offshorability risk also has a small overlap with non-standard employment, but has the 
opposite relationship with the educational level. The results suggest that specific training 
policies attending to those with lower educational levels in non-standard employment 
would be advisable to protect some workers against automation risks, but not against 
offshorability. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a wide social worry about the employment impacts of the current technological 
change. Probably, the most prominent concern is about the risk of automation of a huge 
amount of jobs. There are different available estimations about future employment 
destruction related to automation. The highest estimation corresponds to Frey and 
Osborne (2017), who present calculations that almost half of all jobs in the United States 
(US) have a high risk of being replaced and lost by automation. Other authors decrease 
these estimations down to 14 per cent in the European Union (Pouliakas, 2018) or the 
OECD (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018) or even 9 per cent for the OECD (Arntz et al, 
2016).  
Offshorability is another risk closely related to automation risks. Usually, the approach 
to the displacement of some activities or occupations to other countries is understood as 
exclusively related to globalisation. Although some firms can move offshore as a whole, 
current technological change allows fissuring the workplace and even the operation of the 
different tasks of occupations (Weil, 2014). However, as Blinder and Krueger (2013) 
remark not only are offshorable jobs divisible in simple and routinizable tasks, but also a 
wide variety of complex tasks involving high levels of skill and human judgement thanks 
to the new information and communication technologies. In fact, for the case of the US, 
Blinder and Krueger (2013) estimate that around 25 per cent of all US jobs are 
offshorable.  
Recently, there is an increasing interest in the relationship between offshoring and the 
occupational tasks characteristics (Püschel, 2015), but with disparate results. Goos et al. 
(2009) analyse different types of tasks and offshorability, although their measure of 
offshorability – consisting of news reports – is not related to labour demand outcomes.  
Becker et al. (2013) use micro-data from German firms to analyse the relationship of 
offshoring on the composition of labour demand, and they find a small effect of offshore 
firm activity on tasks composition at the firm level, increasing the share of non-routine 
and interactive tasks in the wage-bill of firms.  
On the other hand, Baumgarten et al (2013) find that offshoring has a substantial negative 
effect on wages, and this negative effect differs by task type. In fact, a higher degree of 
interactivity and, especially, non-routine tasks protect workers against the negative wage 
impact of offshoring, which is not strictly coincident with the results obtained by Becker 
et al (2013). Anyway, Becker et al (2013) and Baumgarten et al (2013) do not use any 
measure of offshorability risk (as Blinder and Krueger, 2013) but a realized truth of 
offshoring of part of the firms’ activities. 
Both risks – automation and offshorability – have the potential to eliminate and deeply 
transform many jobs in the near future across the world. However, we do not know 
exactly how these ‘new’ labour market risks will affect to the same workers suffering the 
‘old’ risk of precariousness linked to non-standard employment relationships.  
Why is this important? The standard employment relationship remains as the core of 
Western labour markets, mainly because of its implicit function for co-ordination and risk 
allocation in labour markets (Adam and Deakin, 2014). Nevertheless, since the 1970s 
different non-standard work arrangements have expanded in developed countries, with 
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significant differences across countries and time. The increase of the numbers of workers 
in non-standard work has reinforced labour market segmentation, leading in some 
countries to greater employment volatility and negative consequences on economic 
stability (ILO, 2016; Toharia, 2005).  
Some authors such as Standing (2011) even consider that there is a distinctive group of 
workers – the ‘precariat’ – detached from the core of the labour market suffering lower 
wages and worse working conditions in a permanent way. The specific form of non-
standard employment depends on national differences in institutions and the evolution of 
national Labour Law. Moreover, a widely accepted manner to define non-standard 
employment as employment arrangements deviating from the standard employment 
relationship in four ways (ILO, 2016): temporary employment (i.e. not open-ended);  
part-time or, in general, normal working hours below the full-time standard in the country 
or the industry, including on-call work; temporary agency work or any other form of 
multi-party employment relationship; bogus or dependent self-employment. 
The most visible relationship between non-standard employment and the current 
technological change has come from digital platforms. A lot of recent attention from the 
media and social researchers, especially lawyers, has focused on the rise of the use of 
dependent self-employment in the gig economy (ILO, 2008; Eurofound, 2018). The 
operation of some digital platforms allowing an easy and cheap outsourcing of small tasks 
has created a new ‘mixed’ terrain between salaried and self-employed workers.  
However, even the gig economy based on the local economy heavily rests on the legal 
framework of independent contractors and self-employment, while these workers do not 
have control over their working conditions nor their payment or working schedule. The 
expansion of this type of dependent self-employment is, in many occasions, an increase 
in precariousness, because of their lower protection levels as these workers assume 
business risks related to the business cycle and they do not enjoy the legal protection of 
workers’ rights. Nevertheless, these workers are a small fraction of total employment. For 
example, Katz and Krueger (2016) estimate that these workers are around 0.5 per cent of 
total employment in the US, and Groen and Maselli (2016) estimate that for the European 
Union they are around 0.05 per cent.1 At least nowadays, this is not the main link between 
‘old’ risks as non-standard employment and ‘new’ risks related to technological change 
and offshoring. 
There is some literature on the effects of automation and offshorability, focusing on 
aggregate outcomes such as polarisation of wages (Autor et al 2006, 2008), productivity 
or the labour share (Autor and Salomons, 2018), and a nascent branch about the impacts 
on individual unemployment spells and post-unemployment effects on job quality 
(Schmidpeter and Winter-Ebmer, 2018).  
However, to our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical evidence jointly analysing 
the ‘new’ risks related to technological change and offshoring and the ‘old’ risk of non-
standard employment. The two most prominent estimations of automation risks (Frey and 
Osborne, 2017, and Arntz et al., 2016) do not even include variables related to contract 
                                                 
1 The most recent estimation of electronically mediated work published by the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics is 1.0 per cent of total employment in May 2017, using a new and specific questionnaire on 
contingent work. See Current Population Survey staff (2018). 
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type in their analyses. Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) compare the median risk of 
automation by contract type, showing that the lowest risk corresponds to open-ended 
contracts (0.46), although for fixed-term contracts the risk is almost the same (0.47). 
Temporary agency contracts and training contracts have the highest risk of automation 
by contract type (0.56). In Pouliakas (2018), the descriptive information shows that 15.5 
per cent of workers with fixed-term or temporary agency contracts face a high risk of 
automation (above 0.7), while those with open-ended contracts facing the same level of 
risk are13.5 per cent.  
On the other hand, there is evidence of actual offshoring on wages by contract type. Görg 
and Görlich (2015) find that offshoring core activities in manufacturing industries reduces 
wages for temporary workers, and Lee and Lee (2015) find that offshoring has different 
impacts on wages of temporary workers, a small positive one when offshoring to OECD 
countries and a negative one in case of non-OECD countries.  
However, we have not found evidence about the offshorability risk by contract type. 
Therefore, our article may provide interesting information to understand whether there is 
an overlap of both risks (i.e. a higher automation risk for non-standard employment), as 
the limited available information points to. In addition, we will provide novel information 
whether there is an overlap of the offshorability risk and non-standard employment, or 
not. 
Our analysis will increase the knowledge of the performance of labour markets with new 
results showing a rich and complex relationship between new and old risks. However, our 
analysis is also interesting from a social and economic policy perspective. In fact, 
developing an effective social protection for non-standard employment to alleviate 
workers’ insecurities and precariousness remains a challenge in many countries (ILO, 
2016; chapter 6). If workers with non-standard work arrangements are also affected by a 
systematic high risk of automation and offshorability, the challenges for social protection 
will be very different in respect to a balanced distribution of the new risks by contract 
type. 
In this article, the empirical analysis uses data from Spain. The Spanish case is interesting 
because this country has had a very high temporary employment rate since the mid-1980s 
(Toharia and Malo, 2000; Toharia, 2005). In fact, labour market segmentation by contract 
type has been a prominent feature of the Spanish labour market. The temporary 
employment rate was above 30 per cent in the second part of the 1990s and the first half 
of the 2000s, almost reaching 35 per cent in 2006. After the great recession, this rate 
decreased to around 25 per cent because of a huge employment adjustment based on these 
workers (García-Serrano and Malo, 2013). Temporary contracts are used across all 
industries and sectors, with different micro and macro negative side effects, from 
precariousness to low training and productivity, putting the quality of jobs at the center 
of the labour market policy debate (ILO, 2014). Recently, there was also an increase in 
the use of part-time contracts (López-Mourelo and Malo, 2015) and the self-employment 
rate has reached 16.5 per cent, which is above the average for the Euro area of 15 per cent 
(OECD, 2018).  
Therefore, in Spain, a distinction of ‘old’ and ‘new’ labour market risks makes sense, 
because the expansion of non-standard employment developed much before the current 
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widespread of new technologies. The main database is the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
from 2011 to 2017, which follows the Eurostat methodology and the international ILO 
definitions for all concepts related to employment, unemployment and inactivity. We will 
use a definition of non-standard employment based on the information provided by the 
LFS, mainly temporary and part-time employment, although we will also present an 
analysis for self-employment.  
For the automation and offshorability risks we use different sources. Following the 
international literature, we use two different definitions: one based on occupations (Frey 
and Osborne, 2017) and other based on tasks (Torrejón, 2018). The first one is an 
adaptation from the US case, while the second one has been obtained from Spanish data 
sources including information on tasks. We use both definitions because Frey and 
Osborne (2017) provide higher estimates for how many jobs are under a high risk of 
automation (conventionally, a risk above 0.7), while task-based approaches provide a 
much lower estimate of jobs affected by a high risk of automation. For the offshorability 
risk, we use one of the indicators provided by Blinder and Krueger (2013), which is based 
on experts’ opinions and according to the authors is more reliable than other the two 
indicators they define using subjective information from interviewees.  
The remainder of the article is as follows. In the next section, we describe the data in 
some detail. In the third section, we present the empirical analysis of the distribution of 
the different risks of automation and offshorability by the different categories of non-
standard employment. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this article consist of an adaptation of automation risk indicators 
estimated by Frey and Osborne (2017) and Torrejón (2017), and the offshorability risk 
indicator provided by Blind and Krueger (2013) to the micro-data of the Spanish LFS 
from 2011-2017. We will explain the basic characteristics of all these indicators and how 
we have combined this information with the LFS. 
2.1 Automation risks: occupational and task approaches. 
The seminal work on automation risk and its impact on employment is Frey and Osborne 
(2017)2. They apply an occupations-based approach. Thanks to interviews with experts, 
they identified the current engineering bottlenecks that machine learning and mobile 
robotics developers face. This was the basic information to define the automation risks of 
a core group of 70 occupations. The objective distinguished occupations that were 
composed of tasks all potentially automatable and occupations composed of tasks not 
fully automatable. For the description of occupation, Frey and Osborne (2017) used the 
O*NET (the US occupational classification). Thanks to the basic information for the 70 
core occupations analysed by the expert, Frey and Osborne (2017) predict the probability 
                                                 
2 The working paper version of their article was released in 2013. In fact, a huge part of the literature 
following or discussing their methodology is previous to the published version of 2017. All key aspects 
discussed here are the same in both versions.  
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of automation for all 702 occupations available in the O*NET3, and analyse the expected 
impacts of automation on the US labour market. 
The main result from Frey and Osborne (2017) was that 47 per cent of all US employees 
were exposed to a high risk of automation, where ‘high’ was defined as a risk from 0.7 to 
1. Another distinctive feature of their prediction was the U-shaped distribution of 
employment by automation risk: most of workers were at the tails of the automation risk 
(33 per cent below an automation risk of 0.3 and 47 per cent above a risk of 0.7), while 
relatively few workers were exposed to a medium level risk (19 per cent of employment 
between 0.3 and 0.7 probability of automation). 4 
We have used the estimated probabilities by Frey and Osborne (2017) for our first 
indicator of automation risk. We have imputed the corresponding automation risk 
estimated by Frey and Osborne (2017) to the 3-digit occupational classification of the 
Spanish LFS5. To transform their original estimations based on the US occupational 
classification we have used the official crosswalks to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations for 2011 (ISCO-2011).6  
Soon after, other authors developed a task-based approach in order to check the prediction 
that almost half of total employment was affected by an automation of 0.7 or above. Arntz 
et al. (2016, 2017), Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) and Pouliakas (2018) are examples 
of this approach at an international level. All of them provide much lower estimates of 
employment affected by a high risk of automation (from 12 to 14 per cent), and the 
distribution of employment by automation risk is not U-shaped but rather an inverted U 
with relatively few people at the extremes of the risk distribution. 
The task approach rests on the availability of a survey with detailed information on tasks, 
and the total risk correspond to the individual and it is the average of the automation risk 
attributed to each task. The main component of the automation risk is an indicator of task 
routinisation. The attribution of a specific automation risk to an occupation depends on 
individualised information. This is the reason we have used a second indicator of 
automation risk based on the task indicators proposed in the European Jobs Monitor 
(Fernández-Macías et al., 2016) and operationalised for the Spanish case by Torrejón 
(2018). In short, his methodology uses the three main tasks indicators defined and 
standardised by the European Jobs Monitor (routinisation, social interactivity, and 
creativity). The automation risk is the weighted sum of the above three task indicators, 
where the weights are estimated through a principal components analysis (Torrejón, 
2018). The estimation of this automation risk indicator is at 2-digit ISCO level, therefore 
we will have less variation than for the automation risk based on occupations. 
 
2.2 Offshorability risk 
                                                 
3 Their estimation uses a Gaussian process classifier. See Frey and Osborne (2107) for the technical details. 
4 See Figure 3 from Frey and Osborne (2017; page 267) 
5 The 3-digit level is the maximum in the LFS micro-data files available for researchers. 
6 This is the reason our analysis begins in 2011. We tried to make a link with the previous version of the 
ISCO, but the data showed a clear break. 
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The offshorability risk is obtained from Blinder and Krueger (2013). These authors 
estimate three different indicators for this risk using a specific survey with detailed 
information about this topic. Two of the indicators are based on subjective information 
and the third one on an expert opinion about what jobs are more offshorable. The analysis 
of Blinder and Krueger (2013) concludes that the last indicator based on experts’ opinions 
is more reliable than the others and this is the reason we use it in our research.  
We have obtained the offshorability risk from the original micro-data of the survey7 for 
the US Standard Occupational Classification (SOC-2000 at 6-digit level) and we have 
used the official crosswalk to the ISCO to obtain the offshorability risk for our 
occupational classification at 3-digit level. The original questionnaire offered 5 options 
for the coders going from not offshorable to offshorable with minor or no difficulty.8 For 
the US case 67.5 per cent corresponded to not offshorable occupations. Because of this 
huge concentration of cases we have defined two categories: 0, not offshorable, and 1, 
offshorable. This second group merges all the possibilities from high to minor difficulty 
for offshoring. As we transform the original information based on a 6-digit classification 
into another with 3-digits, we have some 3-digit occupations combining 2 or more 6-digit 
occupational categories. In these cases, we have allocated the average. The result is a 
variable ranging from 0 to 1, that we can interpret as the offshorability risk. However, we 
have many cases with 0 risk of offshorability, 64.9 per cent, which is close to the 67.5 per 
cent obtained for the US original survey.9 
 
2.3 Non-standard employment definitions 
Finally, in the LFS we have used the closest operational definition to the main four 
categories of non-standard employment established by the ILO (2016): temporary 
employment; part-time employment; contractual arrangements involving multiple parties 
(typically, agency workers); and disguised employment (mainly dependent self-
employment). The use of these four categories presents the following peculiarities in our 
data: 
- Our group of workers with temporary contracts will include temporary agency workers. 
In Spain, the majority of temporary contracts are direct hires by the firms and the 
proportion of agency workers is relatively low in terms of the level of employment 
(Amuedo-Dorantes et al 2008). 
- Part-time contracts refer to workers with a working day less than the standard in their 
industry or firm. Therefore, in the Spanish LFS, part-time does not refer to a specific 
threshold in terms of working hours, but to the standard in the immediate context of the 
worker. For example, we can have a full-time worker with 35 working hours per week 
                                                 
7 The micro-data of this survey are freely available at the A. Krueger’s web page: 
https://krueger.princeton.edu/pages/princeton-data-improvement-initiative-pdii   
8 The detail is: 1, not offshorable; 2, offshorable with considerable difficulty; 3, mixed or neutral; 4, 
offshorable with some difficulty; 5, offshorable with minor or no difficulty. In the original survey, only in 
0.56 per cent of the sample (14 cases) the coders could not assign an offshorability risk to the occupation. 
(Blinder and Krueger, 2013). 
9 For the case of maximum risk of offshorability (equal to 1), we have 9.5 per cent, while the US survey 
had 9.8. 
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because this is the standard in the company agreement, but in a different industry we can 
have a worker with the same working hours, but she will be a part-timer if the standard 
in the company agreement is 40 hours. 
- In our data, we do not have variables to distinguish dependent self-employment from 
proper self-employment. We will use data on self-employed workers who do not employ 
other employees. Therefore, this is a poor proxy for non-standard employment, but we 
have included it for the sake of completeness. In the analyses, we will compare the results 
for self-employed with employees to understand if self-employed workers are more like 
employers or employees in non-standard employment. 
When possible, we will use a four category disaggregation of wage employment. First, 
we consider standard employment those workers with full-time open-ended contracts. 
Second, those with part-time temporary contracts can be considered as ‘fully’ non-
standard employment. Third, the other two categories correspond to a ‘partial’ non-
standard employment: full-time but temporary, and permanent part-time but. Our 
hypothesis is that those in the ‘intermediate’ categories of non-standard employment may 
suffer less problems than ‘fully’ non-standard employment, and we will try to check it in 
the empirical analysis. 
Unless otherwise stated, we will present in all tables the average for the period 2011-
2017. In general, all the results remain within this period, which covers the end of the 
great recession and the beginning of an expansive period. However, we have detected a 
slight general pattern towards a slow increase in the proportion of workers affected by a 
high risk of automation, either under standard or non-standard work arrangements10.  
 
3. Does non-standard employment overlap with ‘new’ risks?  
3.1 Automation risks 
 
Total employment 
Figure 1 shows the mean of the automation risk (according to Frey and Osborne (2017) 
transferred into the Spanish LFS) by employment status. For wage and salary workers, 
the mean risk is higher for temporary (almost 0.7) than for permanent workers (0.6); 
however, the confidence intervals are mostly overlapped. Therefore, on average there is 
not a significant difference between the groups, although the differences in the graph are 
probably hiding substantial differences by subgroups.  
For self-employed workers, we have a slightly lower mean risk (below 0.6), and much 
lower (almost 0.2) for employers. Now the confidence intervals are wider than before, 
from slightly below 0.2 to about 0.7. The automation risk based on tasks following 
Torrejón (2018) shows a broadly similar picture for the mean risk, but with much lower 
differences among all groups of employment and with a narrow range for this risk, from 
above just 0.3 to slightly below 0.7. Although the confidence intervals are narrower than 
for Figure 1, all of them are overlapped. As we explained in the introduction section, other 
                                                 
10 Tables by year are not included for lack of space, but they are available upon request. 
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authors also obtained no or small differences in automation risk by contract type 
(Nedelkoska and Quintini, 2018; Pouliakas, 2018) 
However, no differences at the mean may hide significant differences in the distribution 
of employment by risk level for each subgroup of workers. To analyse this distribution, 
we will define some thresholds for the different risks. For the automation risk based on 
occupations (Frey and Osborne, 2017), we will use the conventional thresholds of this 
literature: 0.3 as the limit between low and medium risk and 0.7 as the limit between 
medium and high risk. However, as we show in Table 1, using these thresholds 40.9 per 
cent of total employment is in the medium level. In order to have a more detailed analysis, 
we have divided the medium level in two groups: medium-low (until 0.5), where we have 
12.9 per cent of total employment, and medium-high, where we have 28 per cent. The 
share of employment under high risk of automation is 33.9 per cent, which is much lower 
than the figure estimated by Frey and Osborne (2017) for the US (47 per cent). In addition, 
considering the four levels of risks we have a U-shape pattern as in the original estimation 
for the US. Nevertheless, in Spain the peaks are not for the lowest and highest levels of 
risks. The high risk has the peak of employment (33.9 per cent), but not the low risk has 
25.3 per cent, which is below – although not far – the second peak in medium-high risk 
(28 per cent). 
In the case of the task-based automation risk following Torrejón (2018), we have all 
observations between 0.3 and 0.7 (see Figure 4). A typical result when using a task-based 
estimation of automation risk is a much lower share of employment for low and high 
risks. In fact, using a task-based approach the distribution of employment by automation 
risk is similar to a sort of plateau with a smooth peak slightly below 0.2 and a slow decline 
toward the right and a steeper slope from 0.7 onwards, as in Arntz et al. (2016, 2017) or 
Pouliakas (2018). Nedelkoska and Quintini (2018) find this pattern for different countries, 
although the OECD countries with a highest mean risk have a sort of ‘pinnacle’ around 
0.6 (Lithuania) or 0.8 (Slovakia). 
In the case of the automation risk estimated by Torrejón (2018), conventional thresholds 
would not be meaningful, as we do not have any case below 0.3 or above 0.7. Therefore, 
we have defined two thresholds: 0.49 and 0.57, to have a distribution of employment with 
around one third of total employment. By construction, we have a similar share of 
employment affected by a high risk of automation respect to occupation-based 
automation risk. Other authors using a task-based approach, as Arntz et al (2016, 2017)11, 
calculated a share of 9 per cent of total employment affected by a risk of automation in 
OECD countries above 0.7, and 12 per cent for the case of Spain, while Nedelkoska and 
Quintini (2018) and Pouliakas (2018) estimate a share of 14 per cent – for the OECD and 
the EU, respectively. Therefore, our results are not directly comparable with other authors 
analysing the distribution of employment by automation risk using a task-based approach. 
However, as we focus on non-standard employment and they do not, we consider this is 
an affordable cost to have a meaningful analysis of non-standard employment and 
automation risk. 
                                                 
11 The risk indicator calculated by Arntz et al (2017) is based on tasks using the survey of adult skills of the 
PIAAC (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies), launched by the OECD. 
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Automation risks and types on non-standard employment 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of employment by the automation risk based on 
occupations distinguishing the different types of standard and non-standard employment. 
First, the shape of total employment is a sort of U, although less clear than in Frey and 
Osborne (2017). In our case, this shape is created by low employment between the levels 
of risks 0.2 and 0.5. In fact, we have the most part of total employment above 0.5. In 
general, the four groups of wage employment share this pattern, either standard or non-
standard, but the two ‘intermediate’ categories of non-standard employment have around 
80 per cent of their employment above the threshold of 0.5. However, employers and self-
employed are mostly concentrated in low levels of automation risk (around 0.2). 
Therefore, considering the occupation-based automation risk, non-standard employment 
tends to have more risk of automation than standard employment, but not self-
employment. 
For the task-based automation risk shown in Figure 4, we have a mountain-shape because 
of the concentration of all employment between 0.3 and 0.7 level risks, as we explained 
above. Nevertheless, employers and self-employed are mostly below 0.5, while the 
groups of wage non-standard employment tend to be above this figure and standard 
employment (full-time and open-ended) is almost fifty-fifty around this threshold. 
Therefore, in relative terms, the task-based automation risk presents a similar distribution 
of risks for non-standard employment, which tend to have more risk of automation than 
standard employment, and, again, self-employment tends to have lower risk of 
automation than any category of wage standard or non-standard employment. 
Table 2 shows a summary of the above distribution using the conventional thresholds we 
define in section 2. Here, we have each type of ‘new’ risk for the different types on 
standard and non-standard employment. For the risks of automation based on occupations 
we have the well-known U-shaped pattern presented by Frey and Osborne (2017) for 
three groups: the lowest and highest levels of risk concentrate the most part of 
employment for the standard employment relationship, for the fully non-standard 
employment (temporary and part-time), and the intermediate group of full-time 
temporary contracts. However, the other intermediate group – part-time open-ended 
contracts – we have a sort of ‘mountain’ with a peak (41.9 per cent of employment) for 
medium-high risk of automation.  
For the other definition of automation risk based on tasks, we have increasing patterns 
except for standard employment relationships – full-time open-ended contracts – which 
presents a decreasing trend. While for part-time workers the distribution is more or less 
balanced, for full-timers we have a clear concentration of employment in the extremes: 
47.4 per cent in high risks for those with a temporary contract and 40.6 per cent in low 
risk for those with an open-ended contract (i.e. standard employment relationships). The 
rest of groups have shares of employment in high risk below 40 per cent, but they are not 
very dissimilar between the two indicators of automation risk. An important difference 
between both indicators of automation risk corresponds to those with open-ended 
contracts, who have shares of employment in low risk around the double for risk based 
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on tasks (second panel of Table 2) than for risk based on occupations (first panel of Table 
2).12 
 
Type of contract  
Table 3 shows that the proportion of jobs with a high automation risk based on 
occupations is higher for workers with temporary contracts than with open-ended 
contracts, especially for male temporary workers who reach 48.8 per cent under high risk 
while for the corresponding women we have 37.8 per cent.13  
The bottom panel of the same table presents the distribution considering the educational 
level of workers. For the compulsory level of education, the larger group is those in 
occupations with a thigh risk of automation: 55.7 per cent for temporary contracts and 47 
per cent for open-ended contracts. For the same educational level, the lowest percentages 
correspond to the low automation risk: 3.2 per cent for temporary contracts and 5.4 per 
cent for open-ended contracts. Therefore, precariousness and automation risks overlap for 
workers with primary education. 
At the end of the same table, workers with the university level are mostly concentrated in 
low risk of automation: 55.6 per cent for temporary workers and 58.5 for permanent 
workers. However, the lowest percentages for this educational level correspond to 
medium-low risk of automation (8.1 and 10.2 per cent, respectively). Therefore, only for 
workers with a university degree there is a sort of U-shaped distribution by automation 
risk, irrespective of the contract type, and with a very important concentration in low 
automation risk. University education shields workers against occupation-based risk of 
automation irrespective of their contract type, although a bit more for those an open-ended 
contract. 
For the rest of educational levels, we have a pattern closer to the primary level of 
education, but with lower differences between automation risk levels, and always with 
higher percentages for temporary contracts in the high automation risk columns. 
To sum up, only a college degree creates a major difference about having a job with a 
low automation risk, mostly irrespective of the contract type. For this educational level, 
there is a poor association between the risks of non-standard work and automation of 
occupations. For the rest of educational levels, the automation risk is higher for workers 
with temporary contracts, especially for those with only mandatory education. For this 
last group both risks are clearly associated. 
Table 6 presents how task-based automation risk mostly affects to male workers with 
temporary contracts (56.2 per cent vs. 37.1 for women) with almost the same share of 
employment for medium and low risk. Nevertheless, for men with open-ended contracts, 
there is a U-shaped distribution of automation risk. For women, there is a more or less 
                                                 
12 As we explained above, the threshold of the low risk group in the automation risk based on Frey and 
Osborne (2017) is 0.3, while for the risk based on tasks (Torrejón 2018) is 0.49. However, as the minimum 
is 0.34, all workers with a low risk according to the risk based on tasks would be in the low-medium group 
of the risk based on occupations. 
13 Considering the evolution across time (not shown here), this gap by contract type against males was 
rather small in 2011 (1.5 percentage point, pp) and increased until 7.7 pp in 2017. 
12 
 
balanced distribution of this risk in the case of temporary contracts, and a decreasing 
pattern as risk increases for open-ended contracts. Therefore, we appreciate a marked 
difference respect to the occupation-based automation risk by contract type. Now, the 
task-based automation risk is mostly overlapped to male non-standard employment, while 
it was not the case for automation risk from Frey and Osborne (2017).  
In the bottom panel of Table 6, the task-based automation risk by educational level does 
not follow the results for the occupation-based automation risk. Now, we do not have any 
U-shaped pattern, with a large concentration in high risk for those with compulsory 
education especially for temporary workers (68.3 per cent) and in low risk for those with 
college especially for those with open-ended contracts (76.3 per cent). Nevertheless, 
although the general shape of the employment distribution seems different for the two 
definitions of automation risk, we also have that those with only compulsory education 
are much more affected by a high risk of automation, while those with a college degree 
are mostly concentrated in a low risk. The percentages are always against those with a 
temporary contract are different respect to the case of the occupation-based automation 
risk shown in Table 3, but, again, a university degree ‘protects’ against automation risk, 
irrespective of the type of contract. 
 
Working time 
Table 4 shows a U-shaped pattern by the occupation-based automation risk for full-time 
and part-time workers, either men or women, except for female part-timers. Anyway, 
part-time male workers are clearly more concentrated in occupations with high and low 
risk of automation (42.2 per cent and 34.4 per cent, respectively), while for part-time 
female workers the intermediate levels of risk have important employment shares. This 
is an exception to the U pattern commented above.14 
In the bottom panel of the same table, we add the educational level. Again, we have U 
pattern for the university level, irrespective of working time. Therefore, for the university 
level the broad picture is similar to temporary and permanent workers, although we have 
a bit higher concentration of temporary workers with a university degree with a low risk 
of automation (55.6 per cent; see Table 3) respect to part-timers with the same educational 
level (around 53 per cent). There is a similar difference in this educational level but in the 
opposite direction between full-timers (around 61 per cent in low risk) and open-ended 
contracts (around 58 per cent in low risk; see Table 3). However, in Table 4 we also have 
a U pattern for part-timers with upper secondary or advanced vocational training, while 
for temporary workers with the same educational levels (as shown in Table 3) we had an 
increasing pattern with a peak in high risk of automation, especially for those with upper 
secondary education.  
                                                 
14 In the quarterly LFS, there is also information if part-time was voluntary or involuntary by gender. While 
voluntary part-time has a U-shape pattern for both genders, for involuntary part-time only male workers 
have this pattern. Female involuntary part-timers have a peak in medium-high risk of automation. In fact, 
for this last group of workers, medium-high and high risk add up almost three quarters of all involuntary 
part-time female workers. These results are not included for the sake of brevity, but they are available upon 
request. 
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Considering part-time work for the automation risk based on tasks (Table 7), we have a 
U pattern apart from female full-time workers, which is not coincident with the 
automation risk based on Frey and Osborne (2017) in Table 4. Another difference is that 
full-time workers have a very different distribution by gender, while men are mostly 
concentrated in high automation risk (above 40 per cent), for women the greatest 
percentages correspond to low risk of automation (also above 40). This suggests a marked 
difference in tasks by gender in full-time jobs, which was not captured by the occupation-
based automation risk. For male and female part-timers, the automation risk based on 
tasks has an almost balanced distribution by risk levels, but with slightly lower 
percentages for the medium risk. 
By educational level (bottom panel of Table 7), we have a very similar picture to the case 
of temporary and open-ended contracts (Table 6): first, there is no any U-shape pattern; 
second, at the compulsory level there is a huge concentration in high risk (above 55 per 
cent, irrespective of the working time); and, third, a very important concentration in low 
risk for those with a university degree, around 77 per cent for full-timers and 67 for part-
timers. In general, those with temporary contracts seem to be more exposed to a high risk 
of automation (based on tasks) than part-timers. On the other hand, full-timers are more 
concentrated on a low risk of automation than workers with an open-ended contract, but 
these differences are very small or disappear for upper-secondary, advanced vocational 
training, and university. 
 
Self-employment 
Self-employed workers are part of non-standard work when they cannot control different 
aspects of their work or when the self-employment status is a disguise for a salaried 
employment relationship where the firm “transfers” the business risks to the workers and 
preventing them to enjoy their rights as salaried workers. These problems affect to the gig 
economy, where self-employment is widely used, as we explained above (see Section 1). 
Unfortunately, our database does not include information to distinguish bogus or 
dependent self-employment, but only all those classified as self-employed workers.  
Table 5 reports the results for self-employed workers (those who do not hire other workers 
and, therefore, they are not employers) and employers. This second group is only included 
as a reference to analyse whether self-employed workers are a sort of ‘employers without 
employees’. In this case, they should be rather like employers in terms of their automation 
risk. However, Table 5 shows that they are quite dissimilar for both genders in terms of 
their occupation-based automation risk. Male self-employed workers do not have a U 
pattern, but two peaks in low and medium-high risk of automation, while females have 
but they are mostly concentrated in low risk (48 per cent). About employers, males follow 
a U pattern with a huge concentration in low risk (54 per cent), and females are similar 
but with even a higher concentration in low risk of automation (58.6 per cent). Noticing 
that the number of female self-employed is much lower than males, self-employed 
workers are, on average, more exposed than employers to the risk of automation, as 
medium-high and high risk join around half of them, while for employers the same levels 
of risk affect around 34 per cent. 
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The bottom panel of Table 5 shows that the share of employment of self-employed and 
employers with low risk quickly increases from 21.9 and 41.5 per cent respectively for 
those with compulsory education until 72.8 y 80.8 for the university level. 
For the case of automation risk based on tasks, Table 8 shows that males have a U-shaped 
pattern while females have a decreasing one, either self-employed or employer. As in the 
case of automation risk based on occupations (Table 5), female self-employed workers 
are concentrated in low risk of automation, now with 61.5 per cent, much higher than in 
Table 5 (48 per cent). In a similar way, there are higher percentages under low risk for 
male self-employed workers, 40.6 per cent (instead of 30.8 per cent in Table 5). For 
employers, we also have a similar broad picture to Table 5, with a high concentration in 
low risk of automation, although percentages are now larger for both genders, again 
female employers have a higher share for those with low risk. Therefore, we confirm that 
self-employed workers are more exposed to automation risk than employers, as we saw 
when analysing the automation risk. 
About the importance of the education level (bottom panel of Table 8), we find similar 
results than for the first definition of automation risk, although percentages are more 
extreme: the shares are higher under low risk and lower for high risk, with a bit better 
results for employers than for self-employed workers. 
 
Regressions on automation risk indicators 
Finally, we run lineal regressions on the two indicators of automation risk to have a whole 
approach on the association with the old risk related to non-standard employment. Table 
12 shows that part-time temporary contracts have a bit larger risk than full-time open-
ended contracts: an increase of 0.47 pp for the automation risk and 0.33 for the automation 
risk. However, the other two cases of non-standard employment have a larger risk of 
automation. Therefore, we confirm what the previous crosstabs showed: the two extreme 
categories, the standard employment relationship – full-time and permanent contracts – 
and the ‘full’ non-standard employment relationship – part-time and temporary contracts 
– have weaker associations with automation risks whatever the definition of this risk – 
based on occupations or tasks. It is also interesting to remark that having university 
education is associated with the lowest levels of automation or automation risk, in line 
with previous results. 
Focusing on self-employment, this type of employment has always a lower risk of 
automation than standard employment relationship. Unfortunately, because of limitations 
of the data we do not know whether this is typical of all self-employed workers – 
including dependent self-employment – or not. Finally, employers have the lowest levels 
of risk also in the three cases. 
 
3.2 Offshorability risk 
As we explained in Section 2, the offshorability risk correspond to the expert-based 
indicator presented in Blinder and Krueger (2013). We define the group of low risk of 
offshorability as those occupations with risk exactly equal to zero, medium for 
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occupations with risk between 0 and 1 (excluding both extremes) and high corresponds 
to risk exactly equal to 1. As shown in Table 1, the most part of employment (64.9 per 
cent) has no risk of offshorability and ‘only’ 9.5 per cent of total employment has a high 
offshorability risk. Around one fourth of employment has a middle risk of offshorability. 
Usually, routine tasks are associated with a higher risk of offshorability (Püschel, 2015), 
but automation and offshorability risks are not necessarily overlapped (Blinder and 
Krueger, 2013). For example, considering the occupation of waiter, some tasks of this 
occupation are routine with a high risk of automation (for example, the payment, as in 
many airports). We can even imagine a waiter robot, but in the same way of a police 
officer or a nurse robot, in other words, there are many engineering bottlenecks to 
disentangle before having this type of full automation of the waiter occupation. However, 
it is very difficult to guess how to offshore the services provided by a waiter. This would 
be a typical where there is a positive risk of automation but the offshorability risk is zero. 
To sum up, while automation risk based upon occupations (Frey and Osborne 2017) or 
tasks (Torrejón 2018) share relevant information, offshorability risk lead attention toward 
a different type of risk. Therefore, presumably non-standard employment will have a 
different association pattern with these two types of jobs’ risks. 
First, we explore the relationship with contract type. Table 9 shows that a bit more than 
70 per cent of workers with temporary contracts have no risk of offshorability – either 
male or female – while the share of employment with no risk of offshorability decreases 
to 55.4 per cent for the case of male and to 65 per cent for female permanent workers. 
Therefore, offshorability risks and non-standard employment risks are not overlapped. In 
fact, the highest offshorability risk affects to around the double of workers with open-
ended contracts respect to those with temporary contracts. 
Considering the educational level in the bottom panel of the same table, the group of no 
risk of offshorability is very high for those with compulsory education, and more for 
temporary than for permanent contracts (around 85 and 76 per cent, respectively). In fact, 
the higher the educational level, the lower the percentages for this level of risk. For those 
with a university degree, the no risk of offshorability group concentrates around 47 per 
cent of all those with temporary contracts and around 40 per cent for open-ended 
contracts. Therefore, we find the opposite pattern we obtained for the automation risk in 
terms of risk and educational level. 
Table 10 shows that part-time workers also have a higher representation in no risk of 
offshorability for men and women (75 and 79.8 per cent, respectively). In the same way, 
part-timers have much lower percentages for the highest risk of offshorability – around 
half for both genders. By educational level, the broad picture is like the case of contract 
type. Here, we also have higher percentages for no risk of offshorability for the non-
standard work arrangement (part-timers) and lower for full-timers. Again, the 
offshorability risk and non-standard employment risk do not overlap and have the 
opposite association with educational level found in the case of automation risk. 
We present the offshorability risk by employment status in Table 11. Unlike what it 
looked for automation risks, we have a very similar distribution of self-employed workers 
and employers by the level of offshorability risk, either men or women. No offshorability 
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risk compounds more than 70 per cent of self-employed workers and the highest risk does 
around 6 per cent of male self-employed and a bit lower of females. For employers, the 
same risk levels are around 70 per cent (more for women) and 3 per cent, respectively. 
The distribution of the offshorability risk for self-employed workers is close to temporary 
or part-time workers with secondary educational levels, and relatively far from the lowest 
exposure to this risk of temporary and part-time workers with the compulsory level of 
education. In general, we have again a decrease of shares in no risk as the educational 
level increases, and this trend is more intense for self-employed than for employers. 
Finally, we run a regression on the offshorability risk. The bottom panel of Table 12 
presents the results for the offshorability risk. Here, part-timers – either temporary or 
permanent – have the lowest risk respect to standard employment relationship. Anyway, 
full-time temporary contracts also have a lower offshorability risk than the standard 
employment relationship. Therefore, here there is no overlapping between old and new 
risks, as the previous analysis also suggested. On the educational level, having a 
university degree is associated with the highest risk of offshorability, which is also 
coherent with the previous results shown in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
In this article, we have explored the possibility of an overlap of the ‘old’ labour market 
risk represented by non-standard employment and the ‘new’ risks as automation and 
offshorability. We have analysed the Spanish case using the data from the LFS from 2011 
to 2017, and indicators for new risks taken from the current literature on automation and 
offshorability. For the case of automation, we have used two indicators: one based on 
occupations, taken from the seminal paper by Frey and Osborne (2017); and other task-
based, following the European Jobs Monitor and taken from Torrejón (2018). Non-
standard employment has been analysed following the main categories defined by ILO 
(2016), as deviations from the full-time open-ended employment contract. 
Are workers under non-standard arrangements exposed to a higher automation risk? At 
first sight, the answer is no. In terms of the mean risk we do not find significant 
differences for the four groups considered of type of contract and working hours. The 
mean risk of automation of full-timers with an open-ended contract is slightly below than 
for the different types of non-standard employment. However, we find differences when 
analysing the distribution of employment by different levels of automation risk. 
Considering the occupation-based automation risk (taken from Frey and Osborne, 2017) 
we have that standard and non-standard employment are mainly on levels of risk above 
0.5, but the ‘intermediate’ or ‘mixed’ groups of non-standard employment have more 
employment above this threshold. In fact, we find that the distribution of employment by 
risk levels of standard employment (full time and open-ended) is closer to ‘full’ non-
standard employment (part time and temporary contract) than to the ‘mixed’ categories 
of non-standard employment. This was unexpected and do not support that, in general, 
non-standard employment is associated to a higher automation risk. However, we obtain 
this result only with the occupation-based automation risk and not with the task-based 
automation risk. For this second indicator, standard employment is clearly concentrated 
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in low risk, the opposite to the groups of non-standard employment. Likely, the low risk 
of standard employment is more related to the job tasks than to the occupation. 
When analysing by contract type and working time, in general we find larger shares of 
employment for non-standard work arrangements – either temporary or part-time – than 
standard – open-ended or full-time, respectively. We obtain this pattern for both 
indicators of the automation risk. We also find that women are less exposed to a high risk 
of automation than men, and the same happens for workers with a university degree. In 
fact, although the high risk affects to more employment for workers with temporary or 
part-time contracts, what really increases the shares of employment under a high risk of 
automation is having only compulsory education and what shields from the automation 
risk is a university degree. 
What happens with the exposure to the offshorability risk? Previous literature remarks 
that there is a potential association between routinisation of tasks and offshorability, but 
both are different and even a higher share of routine tasks is not correlated with a higher 
offshorability risk (Blinder and Krueger, 2013). As routinisation of tasks is closely related 
to automation, because of the lack of relationship of Blinder and Krueger (2013) found 
between their offshorability indicator and routine tasks, we would expect different results 
as those obtained for the automation risk. In fact, we obtain the opposite results about the 
association between non-standard employment and the offshorability risk. The 
offshorability risk and non-standard employment – either temporary or part-time – are 
not overlapped: the highest offshorability risk affects more to workers with open-ended 
contracts than to those with temporary contracts, and more to full-timers than to part-
timers. When considering the educational level, we also find the opposite relationship that 
we found for the automation risks: a higher educational level is associated with a lower 
share of employment with no offshorability risk, and this association is clearer for 
temporary workers and part-timers.  
Therefore, the new risks are not cumulative. Although automation and offshorability are 
linked to the tasks they are different phenomena and while the first one overlaps to some 
extent to the old risk of non-standard employment this is not the case for offshorability. 
As the automation risk seems also closely related to a lower education level, specific 
training programmes for exposed workers with only compulsory education seems 
especially suitable to prevent further problems. Focusing these programmes on workers 
with non-standard work arrangements is also advisable, as they are usually much less 
involved in firm-provided training programmes (Albert et al., 2005). Social dialogue and 
public policies would be crucial to launch this type of programmes for workers in non-
standard employment and low educational levels. Anyway, we must notice that also 
workers with permanent contracts and low educational levels are significantly exposed to 
automation risks. Therefore, it would necessary to incorporate the above measure for non-
standard employment into a wider plan promoting the skills workers will need in the 
future labour market. In this line, analysing the automation risks jointly with the skill 
needs as Pouliakas (2018) seems a promising line of research to design this type of 
programme. 
Finally, it is worth mention that the case of self-employment seems different than standard 
or non-standard employment. Our analysis show that self-employment is closer to 
18 
 
employers in terms of general patterns of automation and offshorability risks. Probably, 
this is related to the difficulty to disaggregate dependent self-employment from the 
general category of self-employment in the LFS. Analysing what happens with dependent 
self-employment in terms of exposure to automation remains as a promising line of 
research about non-standard work arrangements. How dependent self-employment is 
related to the offshorability risk and to what happens with labour demand after a firm 
offshores part of its activities are also open issues on the understanding of non-standard 
employment. 
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Figure 1. Means of the occupation-based automation risk for standard and non-standard 
employment (average 2011-2017). 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
Figure 2. Means of the task-based automation risk for standard and non-standard 
employment (average 2011-2017). 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of standard and non-standard employment by the occupation-
based automation risk (average 2011-2017). 
 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
Figure 4. Distribution of standard and non-standard employment by the task-based 
automation risk 
 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of standard and non-standard employment by offshorability risk 
(average 2011-2017). 
 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Table 1. Total employment for the different thresholds of the automation and 
offshorability risks (average 2011-2017). 
 Automation risk Frey and Osborne (2017) 
Automation risk 
Torrejón (2018) 
Offshorability risk 
Blinder and Krueger 
(2013) 
Low 25.3 38.7 64.9 
Medium 40.9 
Med.-Low 12.9 
28.1 25.6 Med-High 28.0 
High 33.9 33.2 9.5 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
 
Table 2 Distribution of standard and non-standard employment by each type of ‘new’ 
risks (average 2011-2017). 
Automation risk (Frey and Osborne, 2017) 
 Part-time workers Full-time workers 
 Low Med-Low Med-High High Total Low Med-Low Med-High High Total 
Temporary 
contract 20.0 10.7 31.2 38.0 100 15.5 11.8 27.0 45.7 100 
Open-ended 
contract 15.2 9.8 41.9 33.1 100 24.7 13.7 28.3 33.3 100 
Automation risk (Torrejón, 2018) 
 Part-time workers Full-time workers 
 Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total 
Temporary 
contract 29.7 34.8 35.5 100 25.0 27.6 47.4 100 
Open-ended 
contract 30.0 31.8 38.3 100 40.6 30.1 29.3 100 
Offshorability risk 
 Part-time workers Full-time workers 
 Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total 
Temporary 
contract 80.9 15.3 3.9 100 69.5 22.8 7.7 100 
Open-ended 
contract 79.8 14.4 5.9 100 57.2 30.2 12.6 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Table 3. Distribution of employment by occupation-based automation risk considering 
type of contract, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Temporary contract Open-ended contract 
 Low Medium-low Medium-High High Total Low Medium-low Medium-High High Total 
Total 16.9 11.5 28.2 43.4 100 23.5 13.2 30.0 33.3 100 
Men 13.6 10.2 27.4 48.8 100 24.5 14.1 27.3 34.2 100 
Women 20.2 12.9 29.1 37.8 100 22.5 12.3 33.0 32.3 100 
Compulsory 3.2 8.7 32.4 55.7 100 5.4 11.9 35.7 47.0 100 
Low 
vocational 6.3 22.7 27.6 43.4 100 8.6 21.7 31.5 38.2 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 8.5 12.0 31.5 48.0 100 12.9 13.7 33.9 39.5 100 
Upper 
vocational 13.8 16.8 31.0 38.5 100 13.4 16.7 37.5 32.5 100 
University 55.6 8.1 16.7 19.6 100 58.5 10.2 17.7 13.6 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of employment by occupation-based automation risk considering 
working time, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Full-time Part-time 
 Low Medium-low Medium-High High Total Low Medium-low Medium-High High Total 
Total  26.4 13.3 26.6 33.7 100 19.3 10.5 35.4 34.7 100 
Men 25.5 13.2 26.9 34.4 100 21.3 10.8 25.7 42.2 100 
Women 27.7 13.5 26.2 32.7 100 18.6 10.4 38.9 32.1 100 
Compulsory 9.7 11.3 30.0 49.0 100 6.8 9.0 47.0 37.2 100 
Low 
vocational 11.7 22.4 28.7 37.2 100 10.1 20.0 32.1 37.7 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 17.8 14.5 30.1 37.6 100 12.3 10.3 35.5 41.9 100 
Upper 
vocational 16.8 17.9 34.9 30.4 100 17.1 13.7 30.3 38.8 100 
University 61.3 10.1 16.0 12.5 100 54.0 7.4 17.7 20.9 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
 
Table 5. Distribution of employment by occupation-based automation risk considering 
employment status, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Employer Own-account workers without employees 
 Low Medium-low Medium-High High Total Low Medium-low 
Medium-
High High Total 
Total 55.4 10.4 13.8 20.5 100 36.6 15.2 23.6 24.5 100 
Men 54.0 9.1 16.1 20.8 100 30.8 14.8 29.3 25.1 100 
Women 58.6 13.3 8.4 19.8 100 48.0 16.1 12.5 23.4 100 
Compulsory 41.5 8.6 18.7 31.1 100 21.9 12.1 29.3 36.7 100 
Low 
vocational 40.7 21.6 15.2 22.4 100 25.5 24.8 26.2 23.5 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 59.0 9.5 11.8 19.7 100 32.8 20.1 24.2 22.9 100 
Upper 
vocational 49.4 17.1 16.6 16.9 100 32.0 23.6 27.2 17.1 100 
University 80.8 7.0 6.1 6.2 100 72.8 11.3 10.0 5.9 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Table 6. Distribution of employment by task-based automation risk considering type of 
contract, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017) 
 Temporary contract Open-ended contract 
 Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total 
Total 26.4 29.7 43.9 100 39.3 30.3 30.4 100 
Men 20.5 23.3 56.2 100 37.0 25.9 37.1 100 
Women 32.6 36.5 31.0 100 41.9 35.3 22.9 100 
Compulsory 9.9 21.8 68.3 100 17.3 24.9 57.9 100 
Low 
vocational 15.5 42.9 41.6 100 20.6 44.6 34.7 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 22.0 36.2 41.8 100 35.4 37.8 26.8 100 
Upper 
vocational 26.2 46.2 27.6 100 29.3 47.3 23.4 100 
University 66.8 25.3 7.9 100 76.3 20.2 3.4 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
Table 7. Distribution of employment by task-based automation risk considering working 
time, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Full time Part-time 
 Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total 
Total 39.9 27.4 32.8 100 32.3 31.9 35.7 100 
Men 35.8 22.5 41.7 100 34.1 29.2 36.7 100 
Women 45.9 34.7 19.4 100 31.7 32.9 35.4 100 
Compulsory 19.5 22.1 58.4 100 17.1 26.5 56.4 100 
Low 
vocational 21.1 41.5 37.4 100 23.3 45.5 31.2 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 37.8 33.8 28.4 100 28.7 37.1 34.1 100 
Upper 
vocational 30.1 44.2 25.6 100 36.2 44.1 19.7 100 
University 77.7 18.3 4.0 100 66.8 25.4 7.8 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
Table 8. Distribution of employment by occupation-based automation risk considering 
employment status, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Employer Own-account worker without employees 
 Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total 
Total 60.6 19.3 20.1 100 47.7 17.1 35.3 100 
Men 58.3 15.7 26.0 100 40.6 13.8 45.6 100 
Women 65.9 27.6 6.5 100 61.5 23.4 15.1 100 
Compulsory 44.3 22.7 33.0 100 30.7 16.6 52.7 100 
Low 
vocational 41.5 34.0 24.4 100 31.0 30.2 38.8 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 66.2 19.2 14.6 100 51.5 18.9 29.6 100 
Upper 
vocational 54.3 25.8 19.9 100 40.7 28.0 31.4 100 
University 90.0 6.7 3.4 100 87.0 7.3 5.8 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Table 9. Distribution of employment by offshorability risk considering type of contract, 
gender and educational level (average 2011-2017) 
 Temporary contract Open-ended contract 
 Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total 
Total 72.9 20.6 6.5 100 60.0 28.2 11.7 100 
Men 71.9 20.1 8.0 100 55.4 30.1 14.5 100 
Women 73.9 21.0 5.1 100 65.0 26.2 8.8 100 
Compulsory 85.1 9.9 5.1 100 76.0 14.2 9.9 100 
Low 
vocational 78.3 15.1 6.6 100 71.4 18.6 10.0 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 77.1 16.8 6.1 100 60.9 27.3 11.9 100 
Upper 
vocational 63.5 27.2 9.3 100 52.5 32.3 15.2 100 
University 48.3 43.5 8.2 100 40.9 46.4 12.8 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
Table 10. Distribution of employment by offshorability risk considering working time, 
gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Full-time Part-time 
 Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total 
Total 62.4 27.3 10.4 100 78.6 16.4 5.1 100 
Men 61.1 27.2 11.8 100 75.0 18.6 6.3 100 
Women 64.3 27.4 8.3 100 79.8 15.6 4.6 100 
Compulsory 77.8 13.9 8.3 100 90.3 6.2 3.5 100 
Low vocational 72.4 18.3 9.2 100 84.1 11.1 4.8 100 
Post-compulsory 
secondary 62.6 26.4 10.9 100 80.4 14.6 5.0 100 
Upper vocational 54.9 31.5 13.6 100 68.8 22.9 8.4 100 
University 41.9 46.5 11.7 100 56.6 36.9 6.5 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
 
 
Table 11. Distribution of employment by offshorability risk considering employment 
status, gender and educational level (average 2011-2017). 
 Employer Own-acoount worker without employees 
 Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total Risk=0 0>Risk>1 Risk=1 Total 
Total 71.4 25.2 3.4 100 73.1 21.0 6.0 100 
Men 68.8 27.4 3.7 100 72.8 20.5 6.7 100 
Women 77.1 20.1 2.7 100 73.5 21.9 4.6 100 
Compulsory 78.0 19.5 2.5 100 87.5 8.5 4.0 100 
Low 
vocational 77.0 19.1 3.9 100 81.6 12.6 5.7 100 
Post-
compulsory 
secondary 72.1 24.3 3.6 100 69.5 21.7 8.8 100 
Upper 
vocational 66.8 29.5 3.6 100 68.8 23.0 8.2 100 
University 61.2 34.4 4.4 100 46.1 46.6 7.3 100 
Source: LFS and own calculations. 
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Table 12. Linear regressions. 
Dependent variable: Occupation-based automation risk 
  Total employment Wage and salary workers 
  coef. S.E.  coef. S.E.  
Ref: compulsory 
Low vocational -3.902 0.070 *** -3.823 0.076 *** 
Post-compulsory secondary -3.716 0.061 *** -2.555 0.067 *** 
Upper vocational -6.641 0.065 *** -6.246 0.071 *** 
University -28.943 0.055 *** -29.662 0.060 *** 
Ref: Full-time Open-ended contract  
Part-time Open-ended contract 2.775 0.077 *** 1.719 0.077 *** 
Full-time Temporary contract 2.497 0.059 *** 2.561 0.059 *** 
Part-time Temporary Contract 0.751 0.086 *** 0.471 0.086 *** 
Employer -22.552 0.090 ***    
Self-employed -14.408 0.065 ***    
Dependent variable: Task-based automation risk  
Ref: compulsory 
Low vocational -1.723 0.017 *** -1.979 0.018 *** 
Post-compulsory secondary -2.861 0.014 *** -2.885 0.016 *** 
Upper vocational -3.166 0.015 *** -3.400 0.017 *** 
University -9.105 0.013 *** -9.445 0.014 *** 
Ref: Full-time Open-ended contract  
Part-time Open-ended contract 1.230 0.018 *** 0.947 0.018 *** 
Full-time Temporary contract 1.162 0.014 *** 1.204 0.014 *** 
Part-time Temporary Contract 0.503 0.020 *** 0.333 0.020 *** 
Employer -5.503 0.021 ***    
Self-employed -2.153 0.015 ***    
Dependent variable: Offshorability risk 
Ref: compulsory 
Low vocational 3.027 0.092 *** 3.150 0.102 *** 
Post-compulsory secondary 8.819 0.080 *** 9.099 0.090 *** 
Upper vocational 9.840 0.086 *** 10.466 0.096 *** 
University 17.610 0.073 *** 19.022 0.082 *** 
Ref: Full-time Open-ended contract  
Part-time Open-ended contract -6.192 0.101 *** -5.772 0.104 *** 
Full-time Temporary contract -3.101 0.079 *** -2.704 0.081 *** 
Part-time Temporary Contract -6.611 0.113 *** -6.032 0.116 *** 
Employer -10.657 0.118 ***    
Self-employed -9.003 0.086 ***    
Note: All regressions include the following variables: gender dummy (males=1); 4 age 
groups; immigrant (yes=1); public sector (yes=1); 10 sectors; year dummies; 17 regions; 
and a constant term.  
*** significant at 1 per cent; ** 5 per cent, and * 10 per cent. 
Source: LFS and own calculations.  
 
 
